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construing § 20 say that it does not change the common law, even
though the word "agent" can be said to place the other party on
his guard that the signer is acting for another in a representative
capacity. 13 Parole evidence is properly held inadmissible in this
case as § 20 read with § 1814 show the intent that the name of the
principal must be disclosed on the paper. 5 Those states allowing
parole evidence to be introduced by the agent to escape personal
liability may refuse to admit extrinsic evidence of disclosure of
the principal to hold the principal liable on the instrument, as
prohibited by § 18, yet such evidence may be admissible to hold
the principal liable, not on the note, but on the debt the note
evidenced. 6  A. P.Z., Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-ARICULTURAL
ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1938.-The plaintiffs were farmers who
raised tobacco in Georgia. They sold their tobacco in the year
of production as they were unable to process and hold it for sale
in a later year. The sales were at auction markets, through the
defendants who are warehousemen in Georgia, to purchasers
intending to take the tobacco out of the state. The plaintiffs
sued in the district court of the United States to restrain the
defendants from deducting penalties for marketing tobacco in
excess of quotas fixed under the AAA of 1938,1 from the sale
price of tobacco sold at the defendants' warehouse on behalf of
the plaintiffs. From a decree dismissing the bill, the plaintiffs
appealed. Held, decree affirmed. Mulford et al. v. Smith et al.,
59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939).
The plaintiffs contended that the AAA of 1938 is unconsti-
titional for the following reasons: (1) The Act is a statutory plan
to control agricultural production and, therefore, -beyond the
powers delegated to Congress; (2) The standard of calculating
farm quotas is uncertain, vague and indefinite resulting in an
"Purgold v. J. L. Hachtman & Co., 201 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1922); Dayries v.
Lindsly, 128 La. 259, 54 So. 791 (1911); United Drug Co. v. Bedell, 145 Ark.
96, 223 S. W. 372 (1920); Contra: Phelps v. Weber, 84 N. J. L. 630, 87 AtI.
469 (1913); Crandall v. Rollins, 82 N. Y. Supp. 317 (1903); Caldwell County
v. George, 176 N. C. 602, 97 S. E. 507 (1918); Riordan & Co. v. Thronsbury,
178 Ky. 324, 198 S. W. 920 (1917); 11 ROCKY MT. L. Rev. 59 (1938).
14NEGOTIABLE INSTRURMUNTs LAW, § 18: "No person is liable on the instru-
ment whose signature does not appeair thereon.
1527 YALE L. J. 686 (1918).
16Vorachek v. Anderson, 54 N. D. 891, 211 N. W. 984 (1927); 35 W. VA.
L. Q. 92 (1928).
'Agricultural Adjustment Act 1938, § 311-314, 7 U. S. C. A. § 1311-1314
(1938).
RECENT CASES
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary
of Agriculture; (3) The Act permits the taking of their property
without due process of law. First, the Act does not purport to
control production. It sets no limit upon the acreage which may
be planted or produced. It purports to be solely a regulation of
interstate commerce which it reaches and affects at the place
where tobacco enters the stream of commerce,-the marketing
warehouse. The Supreme Court has recently declared that sales
of tobacco by growers through warehousemen to purchasers for
removal outside tile state constitutes interstate commerce.
2
Second, the Act sufficiently discloses that definite standards are
laid down for the Secretary of Agriculture both in fixing the quota
and in nmaking allotments among the states and farms. He is
directed to adjtist allotments so as to allow for specified factors
which have abnormally affected the production of state or farm
in question in the test year. Congress has indicated in detail the
considerations which are to be held in view in making these
adjustments, and, in order to prevent arbitrary action, has
afforded both administrative and judicial review to correct errors.
Third, in applying the Act to the crop y'ear of 1938, the plaintiffs
are not deprived of their property without due process of law.
It is argued that the statute operates retroactively and, therefore,
amounts to taking of the plaintiffs' property without due process
of law. T his argument overlooks the fact that the statute operates
not on farm production but upon the marketing of the tobacco
in interstate commerce. The law enacted in February affected
the marketing which was to take place about Agust 1, following,
and so was prospective in its operation upon the activity it
regulated. The Act did not prevent any producer from holding
over the excess tobacco produced, or processing and storing it
for sale in a later year.
Before this decision, whether Congress had power to forbid or
condition transportation in interstate commerce depended upon
the nature and character of the subject matter. Some of the cases
where the Supreme Court has sustained Congressional legislation
of broad interstate control of subjects under the commerce
clause have been the following laws: The Anti-Lottery Act of
1895,3 closing the channels of interstate transportation to lottery
tickets; The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, barring from inter-
state transportation foods and drugs not inspected and labeled in
2Shafer v. Farmer's Grain Co., 268 U. S. 1S9, 198, 45 Sup. Ct. 41, 44, 69
L. ed. 909 (1925).
328 Stat. 963 (1895), 18 U. S. C. A. § 387 (1926); Champion v. Ames, 188
U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903).
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accordance with the Act;4 The Mann Act of 1910, forbidding
transportation of women from one state to another for immoral
purposes;5 The Federal Motor Vehicle Act of 1919, prohibiting
the transportation of stolen motor vehicles from one state to
another and the receiving, concealment, or sale of the same. 6
From these cases, it appears that the Court has heretofore made
the extent of regulation under the commerce clause depend on
the nature and character of the subject of commerce. But, it
does not necessarily follow that the power of Congress to prohibit
the movement of articles in interstate commerce is limited to
unwholesome commodities. In the instant case, as the Court
points out, any rule which is intended to foster, protect and
conserve commerce among the states or to prevent the flow of
commerce from working harm to the people of the nation is
within the competence of Congress, and it may extend to the
absolute prohibition of the amount of a given commodity which
may be transported in such commerce, without regard to its
nature or character. In short, Congress may use its power over
commerce among the states to prohibit the movement from one
state to another of commodities in themselves wholesome where
it appears that such movement if unrestricted would tend to
disorganize the economic structure of the commodity market.
But whether the commerce power extends to the total prohibition
of the movement of an entire commodity, which is wholesome,
from the state of production to the state of marketing, is still an
open question. E.W.H.
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-UNIFORM SALES ACT.-The de-
fendant, a department store, leased space within its store to a
grocery company and carried advertisements for the grocery
under its own name. In response to such an advertisement the
plantiff purchased a loaf of bread and, when eating some of it,
was injured by wood splinters contained therein. Action was
brought against the department store. Held, judgment for the
plaintiff. Timmins v. F. N. Joslin Co., 22 N. E. (2d) 76 (Mass.
1939).
In many instances a firm wishing to offer a service to its patrons
but unwilling to assume the duties of dispensing that service,
leases space within its establishment to an independent person
434 Stat. 768 (1906), 21 U. S. C. A. § 1-3 (1926); Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S.,
220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 (1911).
536 Stat. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. A. § 397-404 (1926); Hoke v. U. S., 227
U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913).
'41 Stat. 324 (1919), 18 U. S. C. A. § 408 (1926); Brooks v. U. S., 267 U. S.
432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345 (1925).
